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JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
PETER HUBERe
I. INTRODUCTION
Tort law approaches the question of risk quite differently from science. A
store owner defending himself against a claim that a slip and fall caused breast
cancer need not prove generally that trauma does not cause breast cancer; he
need only show that this trauma probably did not cause that cancer, not whether
other traumas cause other cancers elsewhere. Conversely, the plaintiff needs
only to sell a diagnosis: this breast cancer was caused by that fall. The jury is
supposed to decide in favor of the side that has established the "preponderance
of the evidence." In practice, the plaintiff needs only to persuade the jurors that
the risk should be taken seriously. At one level, the legal system is more
symmetric than science in its approach to risk. In an individual trial, one side
affirms, the other denies, and the matter is resolved in favor of one side or the
other by the jury. Each side can hire its own expert witnesses, and in theory
(and quite often in practice) the jury's decision will reflect the strengths of the
scientific arguments that are presented.
But in a larger sense the legal system is highly asymmetric in its handling
of technological risk. The problem is associated with the avalanche of litigation
that might be filed because of a real or presumed risk. So much litigation arose
because the Dalkon Shield led to pelvic infection in some of its users, and
asbestos led to lung disease in some workers, that A. H. Robins and the
Johns-Manville Company were both driven into bankruptcy. These were real
problems, although one might question whether more effective means of
compensating the victims might have been devised. Ending baseless claims -
that trauma causes cancer, or Bendectin causes birth defects - is far more
difficult. The individual claimant may lose, and his case will then be closed.
But for legal purposes the issue remains open, to be raised again any number of
times by others elsewhere. Everyone is entitled to at least one day in court, and
the same question can be litigated indefinitely. In a mass market, a
manufacturer is potentially exposed to many lawsuits if something goes wrong,
and even questionable claims might result in endless litigation. If thirty million
women used Bendectin, and 300,000 of them bore children with birth defects (as
This paper is adapted from PETER HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (1991), and DAVID BERNSTEIN ET AL., PHANTOM RISK: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE AND
THE LAW (forthcoming 1992).
" Senior Fellow, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research; Of Counsel, Mayer Brown & Platt.
723
Huber: Junk Science in the Courtroom
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1992
724 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
expected from the one percent incidence of major birth defects in the population
at large), then 300,000 different juries could (in principle) be asked to determine
whether Bendectin causes birth defects. The legal rule of "collateral estoppel,"
which sometimes bars a defendant from relitigating an issue it has already lost,
does not stop a new plaintiff from relitigating an issue that other plaintiffs have
lost elsewhere. Class actions - the main procedural device courts use to resolve
common questions of law or fact - have not been invoked with any consistent
success in personal injury litigation. In court, scientific facts can remain
perpetually in play. Tort lawyers suggest that this makes the legal system more
faithful to the scientific ideal. Science issues no final judgments; since the time
of Galileo, the scientist's most cherished freedom has been his freedom to doubt,
to disagree, to question anew, and to reconsider. But this analogy between an
open-ended legal process and open-ended science is incomplete. While science
respects the individual's freedom to keep an open mind, science also depends on
the sifting and winnowing process. Science converges. Tort law does not, at
least not over a time scale that is sufficiently short to prevent catastrophic losses
to its victims.
II. SCIENTIFIC AMBIGUITY AND LITIGATION
Litigation is often triggered by tentative scientific results. Lawyers might
seize upon a researcher's first expression of concern, and give it much import,
even as later developments fail to support the concern. For example, several
Boston investigators published a paper entitled Vaginal Spermicides and
Congenital Disorders in the April 1981 issue of the Journal of the American
Medical Association.' The paper suggested that spermicides might be
associated with certain types of birth defects. But the authors cautioned:
"[s]ince a well-defined syndrome among babies with congenital disorders whose
mothers used spermicides was not present, these results should be considered
tentative until confirmed by other data."2 In 1985, however, in large part
justified by this study, a federal judge awarded $5.1 million against the Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corporation for congenital injuries to Katie Wells said to have
been caused by a spermicide.3 In affirming the verdict, a court of appeals
stated: "[lit does not matter in terms of'deciding the case that the medical
community might require more research and evidence before conclusively
resolving the question.4 A year after the verdict the authors of the original
1. ick H. Walker AM et al., Vaginal Spermicides and CongenitalDisorders, 245 JAMA 1329-
32 (1981).
2. Id.
3. Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262, 266-67 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aff'd, 788 F.2d
741 (11th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied en banc, 795 F.2d 89 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, Ortho
Pharm. Corp. v. Wells, 479 U.S. 950 (1986).
4. Wells, 788 F.2d at 745.
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study spoke out again. One acknowledged in 1986 that their work "was not
corroborated by subsequent studies." Another conceded: "I believe our article
should never have been published. In our present litigious environment, the
reservations and qualifications written into a published report are often ignored,
and the article is used as 'proof' of a causal relationship." Two physicians from
the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development noted "the
overwhelming body of evidence indicates that spermicides are not teratogenic. 5
Litigation over the pertussis (whooping cough) vaccine developed along
similar lines. No one disputes that the vaccine has virtually ended the disease,
of which 265,000 cases and 7,500 pertussis-related deaths were recorded in the
years before 1949 when the vaccine was first licensed.6 But a 1984 English
study, serious and cautiously phrased, suggested that the vaccine might cause
twenty-five cases a year of serious brain damage in the United States.' An
avalanche of litigation followed,' blaming the vaccine for brain damage,
unexplained coma, Reyes' syndrome, epilepsy, sudden infant death, and other
afflictions. Concerned about liability, several pharmaceutical companies
abandoned the market, and at one time it seemed that the last United States
manufacturer of the product would be leaving too. Later more reassuring
evidence on the vaccine's safety began to accumulate.9 In March 1990, a report
of a huge study of 230,000 children and 713,000 immunizations concluded that
the vaccine had caused no serious neurological complications of any kind, and
no deaths.' "It is time for the myth of pertussis vaccine encephalopathy to
end," declared an editorial in the Journal of the American Medical
Association."I "Unfortunately, because of the sensationalistic media, the
organization of a group of parents who attribute their children's illnesses and
deaths to the pertussis vaccine, and the unique destructive force of personal
injury lawyers, we now have a national problem that shouldn't be. . . . We
5. James L. Mills & Duane Alexander, Occasional Notes: Teraogens and "Litogens", 315
NEW ENO. J. MED. 1234-35 (1986).
6. Alan R. Hinman & Jeffrey P. Koplan, Perrussis and Pertussis Vaccine: Re-Analysis of
Benefits, Risks and Costs, 251 JAMA 3109 (1984).
7. See id. at 3112, table 5; see also Loveday v. Renton, No. 1982 L 1812 (Q.B. Mar. 31,
1988).
8. Stephen Engelberg, Official Explains Gaffe on Vaccine Shonage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,
1984, at CI, cot. 5.
9. See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ADVERSE EFFECTS OF PERTUSSIS AND RUBELLA
VACCINES (National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 1991).
10. Marie R. Griffin et al., Risk of Seizures and Encephalopathy After Immunization With the
Diphtheria-Tetanus.Perussis Vaccine, 263 JAMA 1641-45 (1990). See also Gina Kolata, Whooping
Cough Vaccine Found Not to be Linked to Brain Damage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1990, at A19, col.
I.
11. James D. Cherry, "Pertussis Vaccine Encephalopathy":. It is Time to Recognize It as the
Myth that It is, 263 JAMA 1679-80 (1990).
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need to end this national nonsense."12
Litigation also has resulted from expectations raised by a new technology.
Physicians, for example, were long mystified by cerebral palsy, but usually
attributed its cause to either trauma or oxygen deprivation during labor. Doctors
needed, some believed, a better way to detect signs of trouble during delivery,
before trouble became disaster. In 1972, the electronic fetal monitor (EFM)
arrived on the scene. A sensor was attached to the baby's scalp in the early
stages of labor, and was used to record the infant's heartbeat and the mother's
contractions. Many doctors enthusiastically welcomed EFM as "a medical
breakthrough that could reduce the incidence of cerebral palsy, stillbirth and
infant death." 3 EFM would flag fetal "distress," allowing doctors to prevent
trauma or hypoxia by performing Caesarean sections. Then, in the 1970s,
obstetricians who delivered babies with cerebral palsy began to be sued in record
numbers. EFM and aggressive surgical intervention quickly became the legally
established standards for prudent care. The medical c6nsensus then began to
move in the opposite direction. A major report of the Institute of Medicine
recently concluded that "overwhelming evidence" shows that EFM "does not
improve neonatal mortality and morbidity rates.""
Still other litigation develops at the periphery of real hazards, for example,
in the emotional issues of intrauterine contraceptive devices (IUDs) and asbestos.
The first half of the IUD story is very familiar. Soon after Robins placed the
Dalkon Shield on the market in 1971, doctors began observing pelvic
inflammatory disease (PID) among its users. The U.S. Food and Drug
Administration then lacked strong enforcement powers over medical "devices,"
but it nevertheless asked Robins to halt sales. Robins complied in June 1974.
Several years of intensive scientific study followed,' which confirmed that the
Shield increased risks of PID in sexually active women by six to ten times. An
outpouring of IUD litigation followed that quickly enfolded other IUDs as well,
including the Lippes Loop, the Saf T Coil, and the Copper 7. The IUD market
folded.
12. Id.
13. Tamar Lewin, Despite Criticism, Fetal Monitors are Likely to Remain in Wide Use, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 1988, § 1, Part 1, at 24, col. 3.
14. Committee to Study Medical Professional Liability and the Delivery of Obstetrical Care,
Division of Health Promotion and Disease Prevention, Institute of Medicine in I MEDICAL
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND THE DELIVERY OF OBSTETRICAL CARE 81 (Washington, D.C.: Nat'l
Academy Press ed. 1989); see also K.K. Shy et al., Effect of Electronic Fetal-Heari-Rate
Monitoring, as Compared With Periodic Auscultation, on the Neurologic Development of Premature
Infants, 322 NEw ENO. J. MED. 592 (1990); Stephen A. Myers & Norbert Gleicher, A Successfid
Program to Lower Cesarean-Section Rates, 319 NEw ENO. J. MED. 1515 (1988).
15. Nancy C. Lee et al., Type of Intrauterine Device and the Risk of Pelvic Inflammatory
Disease, 62 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1-6 (1983).
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Scientists eventually traced the problems with the Dalkon Shield to its nylon
multi-filament tail, which served as a wick for bacteria, especially after
prolonged exposure to body fluids. Other IUDs lacked this flaw. An initial
epidemiologic study by several researchers at the Centers for Disease Control
confirmed the high PID rates for Dalkon Shield users. 6 Two large studies
followed, in Boston and Seattle," that confirmed that the Dalkon Shield posed
a sharply higher risk than other IUDs. However, epidemiologic studies have
failed to implicate other IUDs. In 1988, Lee reported a study 8 that took
careful account of the sexual habits of its subjects. These investigators
concluded that stably monogamous users of any IUD other than the Dalkon
Shield faced no significantly increased risk of PID, except for a very modest
increase in risk in the month or two following the insertion of the device. 9
Other studies showed that oral contraceptives also increase risks of PID by two-
to three-fold, apparently because sexually transmitted pathogens grow in a region
of the cervix that is enlarged by sex hormones. Lee concluded: "the IUD is a
good contraceptive choice for women who are in mutually monogamous
relationships and, therefore, at low risk of acquiring sexually transmitted
infections. " °  A major 1987 review of the literature reached a similar
conclusion,2' and concluded that most IUD's has been "guilty by association."
A year earlier, however, the legal system had delivered its verdict to the
contrary. A headline in the New York Tnes summarized it: "No more IUD's
in U.S.",
The asbestos story similarly unfolded, and again the legal system had
trouble keeping pace with the science. From the start of World War 11 through
the 1970s, some ten million people were exposed to high levels of asbestos in
the shipyards and other industries. Epidemiologic studies clearly showed that
such exposure multiplies risk of lung cancer by five to seven times.
An avalanche of litigation followed. The notion developed that asbestos is
a uniquely potent poison, that produces lung disease whenever it is on the scene.
16. Id.; see also Ronald T. Burkman and the Women's Health Study, Association Between
Intrauterine Device and Pelvic Inflammatory Disease, 57 JAMA 269-76 (1981).
17. Janet R. Daling et a., Pfimary Tubal Infertility in Relation to the Use of an Intrauterine
Device, 312 NEw ENO. J. MED. 937-41 (1985); Daniel W. Cramer et al., Tubal Inferility and the
Intrauterine Device, 312 NEw ENO. J. MED. 941-47 (1985).
18. Nancy C. Lee et al., The Intrauterine Device and Pelvic inflammatory Disease Revisited:
New Results from the Women's Health Study, 72 OBs'rZrlucs & GYNECOLOGY 1-6 (1988).
19. Id. at 5-6.
20. Id. at 1-6.
21. David A. Grimes, Intrauterine Devices and Pelvic Inflammatory Disease: Recent
Developments, 36 CONTPACEPTiON 97-107 (1987).
22. Katherine Roberts, Searle Settles it: No More RID's in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1986,
§ 4, p. 6, col. 1.
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Lawyers then unleashed a second wave of lawsuits, against suppliers of asbestos
in building materials, car brakes, and home hair dryers.
Present scientific knowledge suggests that many concerns about asbestos are
exaggerated. The risks from occupational exposure to high levels of asbestos
are grave. But risks from low-level exposure (as, for example, in buildings with
intact asbestos insulation) are much smaller and apparently insignificant.
Typical asbestos levels in U.S. schools and buildings are "minuscule" -
typically 10,000 to 100,000 times lower than occupational levels known to cause
disease.' Moreover, there are two major forms of asbestos with greatly
different hazards. The form usually found in buildings is probably much less
hazardous than that used so cavalierly in World War I shipyards.
PHANTOM RISK AS SURROGATE
Concerns about risk are often surrogates for other concerns such as
environmental protection or aesthetic preservation.2' Many people view with
distaste the sight of a high voltage power line near a school or running through
pristine wilderness. Chemical pollution is disagreeable whether or not it poses
any real risk of disease. In a notable display of candor, one jury in a dioxin
case returned a verdict of $1 for compensation, and $16 million in
punishment.'
The jury called the science correctly - it found no credible evidence of
physical harm to the plaintiffs. But a spill had occurred, and this jury concluded
that the responsible company should pay heavily, notwithstanding the absence
of injury. Edward J. Burger in his 1990 essay "Health as a Surrogate for the
Environment," describes a similar phenomenon in the regulatory arena: efforts
to keep the municipal incinerator away are often more likely to succeed if based
on health claims, rather than increased traffic density or noxious smells or other
more pressing concerns of the citizens.'
PHANTOM RISK AND THE MEDIA
Phantom risk is a favorite topic of the media. The first shot in Bendectin
23. B. T. Mossman et al., Asbestos: Scientific Developments and Implications for Public
Policy, 247 Scd. 294 (1990). See also Kenneth M. Block & Neil Marantz, Recent Scientfic
Evidence Questions Perception of Asbestos Exposure Risks, N.Y. L.J., 39 (Mar. 14, 1990).
24. MARY DouOLAs & AARON WLDAVSK", RISK AND CULTURE (1983).
25. Kemner v. Monsanto, No. 80-L-970 (Cir. Ct., St. Clair Cty., I31. 1987); see also E. R.
Shipp, Marathon Trial on Dioxin Spill Nears End in Illinois After 3.5 Years, N.Y. TtME5, Aug. 19,
1987, at AIS; Monsanto Liable in '79 Dioxin Spill, N.Y. TMES, Oct. 23, 1987, at A12, col. 6.
26. See generally Edward J. Burger, Jr., Health as a Surrogate for the Environment, 133
DAEDALuS (Fall 1990).
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litigation was accompanied by a story in the National Enquirer published in
October, 1979.27 In the next five years, leading up to Merrell-Dow's $120
million offer to settle all outstanding claims, the media played a critical role in
mobilizing Bendectin lawyers and their clients. Media attention to asbestos,
Agent Orange, and the accident at Three Mile Island, likewise fueled public
concern, mobilized claimants, and triggered lawsuits seeking compensation for
fear of cancer, anxiety, declining property values, and so on.
... AND POLITICS
Political pressures are often important as well. In 1970, Senator Gaylord
Nelson held widely publicized hearings and publicized the supposed risks of oral
contraceptives. The dramatic testimony, based on preliminary scientific
evidence and studies that have since been largely repudiated, was extensively
covered by the press. Millions of young women began searching for a safer
contraceptive options. At Nelson's hearings, a persuasive critic of the pill's
risks and advocate of safer alternatives was Dr. Hugh J. Davis of Johns Hopkins
University. Four years earlier he had developed one such alternative, the
Dalkon Shield.
The interplay between politics and science is a contentious issue but one to
which our authors frequently return. The Bendectin controversy was sharpened
by publicity and demands for FDA action by the Health Research Group. Other
political pressures are apparent in behavior of government agencies, which often
become advocates for their constituencies.
... AND FEAR
Litigation often turns on fear. A legal theory now held by some academics
and jurists links legal rights not just to the actuality of risk but also to the
public's widely shared fears. Some courts permit recovery only if a claimant's
anxiety about rabies or cancer (say) is scientifically reasonable, and would be
shared by a knowledgeable doctor or scientist in the same position. But others
ask only whether the public at large shares the fear; the factual basis for the fear
is irrelevant. Public anxiety is far easier to prove than real hazard. For
example, a lawsuit was recently filed by New York landowners against a power
company, claiming that fear of cancer from the lines depressed their property
27. Experts Reveal... Common Drug Causing Deformed Babies, NAT'L ENQUIRER, Oct. 9,
1979, at 20.
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values.'
FINANCLAL INCENTIVES
Sometimes, financial incentives sustain a scientific controversy that would
not exist but for litigation. An example is the theory of traumatic cancer. The
theory originated in the 17th Century, but was in decline by the Nineteenth.
Then, quite abruptly, many doctors became believers once again. The rapid
shift in medical attitudes began in Germany in 1884, and swept across the
American continent in the first decades of this century. By 1897, one writer
blamed trauma for half of all bone cancers.
These changes were motivated by legal, and not scientific developments.
Germany introduced the world's first worker's compensation program in 1884,
and by the early 1920s all but eight American states had enacted similar
programs. As one observer noted in 1959, the carcinogenic properties of
trauma "increase[d] in potency each year and in direct proportion to the
broadening of insurance coverage." 29  "The cancerigenic potentialities of
mechanical trauma would probably have long since ceased to stimulate any
significant amount of scientific interest," wrote one commentator in 1954, "were
it not for the fact that so many claims for compensation are filed each year."'
Traumatic cancer would have been "relegated to limbo" far sooner, declared a
Mayo Clinic review twenty years later, but for "lawyers constantly keeping the
question alive."'"
More recently, the prospect of insurance benefits has promoted "clinical
ecology." This controversial medical theory blames trace environmental
pollutants on a host of ailments, including one with the inflammatory name of
"chemically induced AIDS." Clinical ecology is viewed skeptically by the
mainstream medical community,32 but is vociferously defended by a small
number of clinicians and patients. One survey of fifty consecutive patients
28. Zappavigna v. New York, No. 74085 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Sept. 21, 1989), cited In N.Y. Judge
Rejects 'Cancerphobia"DamagesAgainst NYPA inLine Case, ELECrRICUTIL. WK., Oct. 23, 1989,
at 1 I. See also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Daley, 253 Cal. Rptr. 144 (Ct. App. 1988); Houston
Lighting & Power Co. v. Klein Indep. School Dist., 739 S.W.2d 508 (TCex. Ct. App. 1987).
29. R. CRANE, THE RELATIONSHIP OF A SINGLE ACT OF TRAUMA TO SUBSEQUENT
MALIGNANCY, reprinted in ALAN R. MORrrZ & DAVID S. HELBERO, TRAUMA AND DISEASE 147
(1959), quoted in Darrell W. Johnson, Sufficiency of Proof in Traumatic Cancer: A Medico-Legal
Quandary, 16 ARK. L. REV. 243, 267 (1962).
30. ALAN R. MORITZ, PATHOLOGY OF TRAUMA 116 (2d ed. 1954); Curphey, Trauma &
Tumors, 1 J. FOR. Sci. 27 (1956).
3 1. G. Orwoll, Monkman et al., Trauma and Oncogenesis, in Mayo Clinic Proceedings, Mar.
1974, at 162.
32. See Eliot Marshall, Immune System Theories on Trial, 234 SCi. 1490 (1986).
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referred for re-evaluation of a clinical-ecology diagnosis found that forty-three
were pressing worker's compensation claims and two others were pursuing tort
claims against chemical manufacturers. 3 Only five, apparently, had no direct
financial interest in being sick, and one of those was involved in child custody
litigation.
Finally, there are the financial incentives to litigators. Phantom risk has
proved very profitable in court. Most juries decide cases in a way that is
consistent with mainstream science. But some do not, delivering substantial
payoffs for questionable claims. With Bendectin, the first thousand claims in
the giant class action suit were resolved in line with mainstream science, though
not before Merrell was impelled to offer $120 million to buy its way out of the
legal quagmire.' Merrell ultimately won most of the individual trials too.
Most juries made no award; but some returned verdicts ranging from $20,000
to $95 million.' Most of these verdicts were overturned on appeal; but some
survived even that additional test. The average award (i.e. the total awarded in
all the trials, divided by the number of trials) was close to $100,000. To a tort
lawyer, a single million-dollar verdict that survives all appeals can more than
offset a long string of losses. To the company that has to defend itself against
these many claims, the process itself can be a disaster, despite many wins and
only occasional losses.
EXPERT WrrNESSES: THE LEGAL RULES
Until the mid-1970s, the admission of scientific evidence in court was
governed largely by the Frye rule, named after a 1923 federal court decision in
a criminal case.3 Expert testimony was to be admitted only when it had
received "general acceptance" in the relevant scientific community.37
33. Abba I. Tert, Environmental Illness: A Clinical Review of SO Cases, 146 ARCH. INTERN.
MED. 145 (1986).
34. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Product Litigation, 614 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D.
Ohio 1985), affid, 857 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, Hoffman v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
488 U.S. 1006 (1989); see also In re Bendectin Products Liability Litigation, 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.
1984).
35. Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 83-3504, 1987 WL 18743 (D. D.C. Oct. 1, 1987)
The trial judge cut the verdict to $20 million. Id. at *5. A court of appeals overturned the entire
award (without even remanding for a new trial) in March, 1990. Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, 897
F.2d 1159, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
36. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
37. Id. at 1014. The full test reads as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable states is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established
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For half a century, Frye served reasonably to exclude exotic, unreliable
evidence from the courtroom. The rule came under attack, however, in the
1960s and '70s. The consumer and environmental movements were gathering
momentum at this time. The prevailing intellectual mood was
anti-establishment, and Frye was seen as elitist and unhelpful, particularly in
cases involving new pollutants, and unfamiliar hazards. In the legal world,
meanwhile, theories of liability were evolving to give plaintiffs the advantage at
trial. Frye critics felt that an alleged victim of chemical poisoning or some other
toxic tort should not be denied compensation just because his offer of proof
could not meet the exacting standards of "acceptance" in a broader scientific
community.As
Opponents of Frye seized their opportunity when the Federal Rules of
Evidence went into effect in 1975. The Rules are used in all federal trials and
had also been adopted in various forms by thirty-one states as of 1988. 3' The
Frye general acceptance standard was given no mention in the Rules or in the
Advisory Committee notes that accompanied them. The anti-Frye forces seized
this opportunity to advocate the abandonment of the "general acceptance" test
in favor of a "relevancy" test, which would admit any expert testimony deemed
helpful and germane to the scientific issue before the court.' Other
commentators agreed that Frye itself was no longer viable, 4' but argued that
general acceptance may "still have a bearing on reliability and consequent
probative value of the evidence."42 Still other scholars have interpreted the
absence of Frye from the Federal Rules as evidence that the Frye test has
survived the enactment of the Rules.'
The commentators who believe that Frye was superseded by the new Rules
point to Rule 702 to support their case. It provides that expert testimony is
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id.
38. The spirit of the sixties has apparently not yet disappeared. See, e.g., Robert L. Schwartz,
There is No Archbishop of Science, 69 B.U. L. REV. 517 (1989) (arguing that judges should not
screen scientific evidence because scientific truth is relative and culturally determined).
39. Bert Black, Evolving Legal Standardsfor the Adnissibility of Scientific Evidence, 239 ScI.
1508, 1512 n.1 (1988).
40. See EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 608 (3d ed. 1984), quoted
in Black, supra note 39, at 628 n.1 ("Any relevant conclusions supported by a qualified expert
witness should be received unless there are distinct reasons for exclusion."). Scientific evidence
would thus be treated like any other evidence.
41. See JACK WEINSTEIN & MARGARET BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 703(03)
[hereinafter WEINSTEIN] ("[tlhe silence of the rule and its drafters should be regarded as tantamount
to an abandonment of the general acceptance standard.*).
42. Id.
43. Paul C. Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States a
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (1980).
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admissible "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."" This
seems fairly close to the relevancy standard advocated by critics of Frye.45
While the survival or demise of Frye continues to be debated,' the rule
did, for a period at least, seem to lose much of its conviction even in
jurisdictions that still nominally enforced it.'7 Though Frye remained officially
on the books in a majority of jurisdictions, ' a growing number of courts in
fact applied much more liberal standards for scrutinizing expert scientific
testimony. '  In one 1984 case, for example, the plaintiff claimed injuries
resulting from his exposure to paraquat. The expert who testified for the
plaintiff presented views not generally accepted in the scientific community.
The trial judge admitted the testimony, and the jury found for the plaintiff. A
panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. "[Judges], both trial and
appellate, have no special competence to resolve the complex and refractory
causal issues raised by the attempt to link low-level exposure to toxic chemicals
with human disease," the appellate court wrote. "On questions such as these,
which stand at the frontier of current medical and epidemiological inquiry, if
experts are willing to testify that such a link exists, it is for the jury to decide
whether to credit such testimony."s' In 1988, the Eighth Circuit Court
44. FED. R. EVID. 702.
45. See, e.g., CLEARY, supra note 40.
46. As late as the March, 1990 issue of the TEXAS LAw REVIEW Professor Jonakait gives this
debate substantial coverage. Randolph Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning and the
Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEXAS L. REV. 745, 765-67 (1990).
47. Historically, many scientific evidence issues have been resolved by courts without any
reference to Frye. Black, supra note 39. In general, Frye seems to be cited far less often in civil
cases than in criminal cases - not surprising, considering that Frye itself was a criminal case. The
author of this chapter recently researched dozens of cases spanning many decades involving claims
that physical trauma caused cancer without seeing even one reference to Frye.
48. Edward Imwinkelreid, The Bases of Expert Testimony: The S llogistic Structure of
Scienific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1, 6 (1988).
49. WEINSTIN, supra note 41, at 477-48.
50. Ferbee v. Chevron, 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
51. Id. at 1534. The court added: "If reasonable jurors could conclude from the expert
testimony that paraquat more likely than not caused Ferebee's injury, the fact that anotherjury might
reach the opposite conclusion or that science would require more evidence before conclusively
considering the causation question resolved is irrelevant." Id. at 1535. Allowing the jury to decide
the issue does not always benefit plaintiffs.
In a recent case involving PCBs, the jury found for the defendants, but the judge ordered a
new trial in order to prevent what he saw as a "miscarriage of justice." The appeals court
overturned his decision, ruling: "We would not expect disagreement between judge and jury upon
the integrity of multiple witnesses to be a sound basis for a new trial." Scott v. Monsanto, 868 F.2d
786, 791 (5th Cir. 1989).
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likewise reaffirmed the "relevancy" standard: "The relative skill or knowledge
of an expert," the appellate court wrote, "goes to the weight of that witness'
testimony, not its admissibility" and is therefore for the jury to weigh.52
More recently, however, a growing number of courts began to apply a
somewhat stricter "balancing" test.' A major turning point in judicial attitude
was an opinion by Judge Patrick Higginbotham. While adhering to an appellate
court's "deferential standard for review" of decisions regarding the admission
of expert testimony, Judge Higginbotham declared that the court would keep a
"sharp eye" on instances where "the decision to receive expert testimony was
simply tossed off to the jury under a 'let it all in' philosophy."'
In one leading "strict scrutiny" case that followed, 5 a federal jury
awarded a plaintiff $1.16 million for birth defects allegedly caused by Bendectin.
Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson overturned the award, and a unanimous panel'
52. Loudermill v. Dow Chem. Co., 863 F.2d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1988); see also Osburn v.
Anchor Lab., Inc., 825 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub. nom. Rachelle Labs. v. Osbur,
485 U.S. 1009 (1988) ("medical expert opinion testimony that is controversial can support a jury
finding of causation as long as the doctor's conclusory opinion is based upon well-founded
methodologies." Id. at 915).
53. See generally Black, supra note 39, at 1511 ("[a] growing number of courts now delve into
the reasoning behind an expert's conclusion and require that this reasoning reflect accepted scientific
practice."); Rothstein & Crew, When Should the Judge Keep Expert Testimony From the Jury,
INSIDB LIT., Apr. 1987, at 19 (discussing strict and lenient trends in judicial scrutiny of expert
testimony).
By 1985, a popular and relatively strict formulation of the balancing test said that district
courts should conduct a preliminary inquiry focusing on (1) the soundness and reliability of the
process or technique used in generating the evidence, (2) the possibility that admitting the evidence
would overwhelm, confuse, or mislead the jury, and (3) the proffered connection between the
scientific research or test result to be presented, and particular disputed factual issues in the case.
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985). While that case explicitly rejected
Frye's general acceptance test, in a later case, Sterling v. Velsicol, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988),
a court applied a balancing test in a way that incorporated the general acceptance test and added
more conditions. Id. at 1237. The court said that Rule 702 requires: "(1) a qualified expert (2)
testifying on a proper subject (3) which is in conformity to a generally accepted explanatory theory
(4) the probative value of which outweighs it prejudicial effect." Id. at 1208. (emphasis added) Cf.
Boggess v. Monsanto, No. 86-3081 slip op. at 9 (4th Cir. 1987) (exclusion of flawed evidence
"clearly within the discretion of the trial court.")
54. In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986).
55. Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd, 857 F.2d
823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989); accord Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
897 F.2d 1159 (1990).
56. Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 882 (1989).
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of the D.C. Federal Court of Appeals affirmed. 5" Other judges have begun to
take a somewhat harder line on expert credentials and qualifications.' Still
others have attempted to give new weight to Federal Rule of Evidence 403,
which requires that testimony must be more probative than prejudicial,59 and
Rule 703, which demands that the facts or data used by experts must be of the
type "reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences on the subject."' In litigation over the effects of Agent
Orange on Vietnam veterans,6' for example, Judge Jack Weinstein excluded
plaintiffs' expert's testimony because the expert's opinions were based on
57. The court explicitly refused to follow Oxendine. Id. at 825. But see Osbum v. Anchor
Lab., Inc., 825 F.2d 908, 915 (5th Cir. 1987) (expert's opinion need not be generally accepted in
the scientific community before it can be sufficiently reliable and probative to support a jury finding)
(citations omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Rachelle Lab. v. Osburn, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988).
58. See, e.g., Apostol v. United States, 838 F.2d 595 (Ist Cir. 1988); see also Will v.
Richardson-Merrell, 647 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Mallory v. Monsanto Co., No. 29843 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1988); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 706 F. Supp. 358, 370, 374 (E.D. Pa. 1988);
Warden v. Taylor, No. 81-28711 (Harris County Ct. Aug. 10, 1987).
59. See Jackson v. Johna-Manville Sales Corp, 750 F.2d 1314, 1321 (5th Cir. 1985). See also
Nachtaheimv. Beech Aircraft Corp., 847 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1988).
60. FED. R. EVID. 703. See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 830
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (dismissing expert's opinion as not satisfying Rule 703). As Professor Edward
Inwinkelreid points out, Rule 703 seems to be targeted towards an expert's "minor premise," not
his overall testimony, and seems designed to actually liberalize the admission of expert testimony.
Imwinkelreid, supra note 48, at 9. See also Advisory Committee's Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 283
(recognizing fears that 'enlargement of permissible data may tend to break down the rules of
exclusion unduly"). Certainly, nothing in Rule 703 would seem to give a judge power to exclude
testimony as whole.
The full text of Rule 703 is as follows:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to an expert before the hearing.
If of a type relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 703. But see Jack Weinstein, Role of Expert Testimony and Novel Scientific
Evidence in Proof of Causation, Address Before the ABA Annual Meeting 30-31 (Aug. 9, 1987)
(footnotes omitted). Weinstein said:
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a judge can exclude expert testimony ....
[through] Rule 703, which allows an expert to base his opinion on the type of evidence
reasonably relied upon by experts in his field. In some cases examination of the basis
of an expert's opinion reveals that it is supported by no reliable evidence at all. In such
cases exclusion of the expert's opinion under Rule 703 and a grant of summary
judgment to the opposing party might be appropriate.
See also Mateer v. U.S. Aluminum, No. 88-2147, 1989 Lexis 6323 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 1989)
(summary judgment granted in Trichlorethylene exposure case on grounds that plaintiff's experts'
.ultimate conclusions are not supported by the type of evidence reasonably relied upon in the
scientific community to determine the health effects of exposure to toxic substances" thus violating
Rule 703. Id. at 7).
61. In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1243-48 (D.C.N.Y. 1985), aff'd on other grounds,
818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
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"facts" and "data" not "reasonably relied" upon by experts in the field.6
Another federal appellate court affirmed a trial judge's decision to exclude
expert testimony regarding the causal relationship between illness and exposure
to a herbicide.'
The more recent trend appears to be toward reaffirming stricter standards
against evidence from the fringes of the scientific community. One slowly
evolving consensus, for example, is truly scientific studies are subject to peer
review.' In one oft-cited case,' Federal District Judge Patrick F. Kelly,
rejected the testimony of plaintiffs' experts in a radiation case. "This court is
disappointed with the apparent fact that these so-called experts can take such
license from the witness stand," Judge Kelly wrote.' "T]hese witnesses say
and conclude things that, in the Court's view, they would not dare report in a
peer reviewed journal."' A year later, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
exclusion of an epidemiological study offered on the swine flu vaccine, in part
because it had not been peer reviewed.' Both the First and the Ninth Circuits
62. Weinstein added that expert testimony on a particular subject must meet "minimum
standards of reliability" in order to be put before a jury. Id. at 1245.
63. Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co., 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987).
64. Judge Higginbotham wrote:
Many experts are members of the academic community who supplement their teaching
salaries with consulting work. We know from our judicial experience that many such
able persons present studies and express opinions that they might not be willing to
express in an article submitted to a refereed journal of their discipline or in other
contexts subject to peer review. We think that is one important signal, along with many
others, that ought to be considered in deciding whether to accept expert testimony.
In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1986).
65. Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374 (D. Kan. 1984). That same year, in Ellis v.
International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1984), the court noted the importance of peer
review of epidemiological studies: "publication and survival of peer review . . . is one further
indication that the reliability of the contested data far exceeds that normally accorded 'preliminary
data' and 'speculation.'" Id. at 302 (footnote omitted).
66. Johnston, 597 F. Supp. at 415.
67. Id. at 415. The plaintiffs had already gained a $1.6 million settlement from other
defendants who were afraid that the court would not be able to see through plaintiffs' experts'
testimony. See Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 419-23 (D. Utah 1984) (court admits
testimony from same experts rejected in Johnston), rev'd on other grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
68. Perry v. United States, 755 F.2d 888 (1Ith Cir. 1985) ("[dlespite appellant's protestations,
the examination of a scientific study by a cadre of lawyers is not the same as its examination by
others trained in the field of science or medicine." Id. at 892). See also Zeck v. United States, 559
F. Supp. 1345, 1349 n.3 (D.S.D. 1983) (letters to the editor of medical journals have no probative
value in swine flue case because they are anecdotal and have not been peer-reviewed); Kubs v.
United States, 537 F. Supp. 560, 562 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (non-peer reviewed testimony rejected in
another swine flue case).
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have taken similar positions in Bendectin cases.' And in a 1988 ruling
involving PCBs,' a New Jersey state court rejected an expert's testimony as
"having not been previously recognized by any recognized tribunal, having no
substantial minority acceptance, and having no support in the scientific
literature." 7  Judicial insistence on peer review is still by no means
unanimous, however.'
Other judges have taken steps to discount "hired gun" experts who earn
much of their income by testifying." As one federal trial judge wrote, some
experts have "become advocates for a cause and have therefore departed from
the ranks of objective expert witnesses."74 Other rejected testimony from
witnesses who undertook to testify, "not as detached scholars in the area of birth
malformations motivated by the sole purpose of assisting the fact-finder with an
objective evaluation of the relevant data but as partisans. When expert witnesses
become partisans, objectivity is sacrificed to the need to win."' 5 As discussed
later in this article, a growing number of state legislatures have also undertaken
similar initiatives.
The qualification of experts plays a particularly crucial role in the early
stages of litigation. In scientifically complex cases, experts are often, for all
practical purposes, the entire case. If the plaintiffs' proffered expert testimony
is excluded there will be no trial at all; the case will be decided summarily for
the defense. In practice, this is often the only way the defense can come close
to "winning" a case, because the costs of litigation (which the defense must
shoulder for itself, win or lose) will often be very substantial. An important
breakthrough for summary judgment motions in toxic tort cases came in Judge
69. Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Laboratories, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987); Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
70. Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 542 A.2d 975 (N.J. Super. 1988), rev'd, 576 A.2d 4
(1990).
71. Id. at 23 (Decision of Apr. 29, 1988); for further discussion of motions in limine, see
Richard A. Rothman & Arvin Maskin, Defending lmmunmooxicihy Clains, 3 Toxics L. RzP. (BNA)
1219, 1228 (Mar. 1, 1989).
72. See, e.g., Rudell v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., No. 85-0115-CV-W-5 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 19,
1987), in which the court refused to exclude a suspect study, holding that "[tihe jury can decide how
much credence should be given to any or all ... reports."
73. Judge Higginbotham wrote:
ITihe professional expert is now commonplace. That a person spends substantially all
of his time consulting with attorneys and testifying is not a disqualification, but experts
whose opinions are available to the highest bidder have no place testifying in a court of
law, before a jury, and with the imprimatur of the trial judge's decision that he is an
"expert."
In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986).
74. Allen v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374, 411 (D. Kan. 1984).
75. Rubinsteinv. Marsh, No. CV-80-0177, 1987 WL 30608, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1987).
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Weinstein's opinion in the Agent Orange litigationf' Having ruled that the
plaintiffs' proffered expert testimony was inadmissible, Weinstein was then able
to grant summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs had presented no
material issue of fact in dispute. The Supreme Court has since liberalized the
standards for granting summary judgment.'
Finally, most judges faced with conflicting scientific evidence have the
power to appoint their own experts,' special "masters" to rule on evidentiary
motions, or (in non-jury trials) even an "advisory jury" composed entirely of
experts. These techniques can reduce the number of scientific issues left for the
judge or jury to cope with at the trial. 9 But while court-appointed experts are
widely favored in theory,'m they are rarely used in practice,"' perhaps because
judges fear their choice of expert might unduly influence the jury.'
76. In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
77. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) ("one of the principle purposes of the
summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and
we think it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose." Id. at 423);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (the standard for summary judgment
is whether a 'fair minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented..
• . A scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient."); Matshushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (summary judgment pierces the
pleadings and assesses the proof in order to see whether there is a need for trial); see also Knight
v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1987) (hostility to summary judgment based on
'misconception"), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932 (1987).
78. They get this power from FED. R. EVID. 706.
79. Some commentators have called for one or another version of science courts, usually on
the model of the patent court system but thus far this idea has not resulted in any experiments. E.
Donald Elliott, Issues of Science and Technology Facing the Federal Courts 20 (Apr. 4, 1988)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). See also Tahirih V. Lee, Court-Appointed Experts
and Judicial Reluctance: A Proposal to Amend Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 YALE
L. & PoL'y Rv. 480, 496-97 (1988). Other commentators have called for requiring or
encoursgingjudges to take basic science course. See generally Elliott, supra.
80. According to a 1987 Harris Poll of two hundred federsljudges, seventy-sixpercent of those
surveyed said they favored the use of independent expert witnesses in cases "involving technical or
scientific issues," with twenty percent opposed. Louis Harris & Assoc., Judges' Opinions on
Procedural Issues 45, Table 6.1 (Study No. 874017) (Oct.-Dec., 1987), cited in Elliott, supra note
79, at 11.
81. Constance Holden, Science in Court, 243 Sci. 1658 (1989).
82. Id.; Lee, supra note 79, at 495-96. One proposal that would relieve some of
Higginbotham's worries would modify Rule 706 to require parties to negotiate for the appointment
of a single expert witness for each subject area which requires expert testimony. The court would
remain involved in the negotiations and could appoint the expert if the negotiations failed to produce
an agreed-upon expert. Johnson, Court-Appointed Scientific Expert Witnesses: Unfenering
Expertise, 2 HIGH TEcH. L.J. 249 (1988).




What is good science? How can we identify it? The trial lawyer and his
acolytes will never tire of telling stories about how high priests of science have
been proved badly wrong by "cranks" and "mavericks" in times past. Galileo,
the patron saint of all heretics, figures often in such stories. Let's not ostracize
the "mini Galileo," pleads a plaintiff's lawyer; the legal system must be
"capable of advancing. " ' Honor the expert "at the edges of the bell curve,"
advises the chemical-AIDS maven Alan Levin, "as was Galileo and as are other
people at the frontiers of medicine or science."'
No doubt about it: the views of the establishment are sometimes wrong,
in science and medicine as in law. Galileo gained fame by challenging one
orthodoxy but eventually became part of another: he refused to believe that the
moon caused tides, or that planets moved in ellipses, as the upstart Johannes
Kepler maintained. Eighteenth-century astronomers stubbornly refused to
believe that stones fell from the sky. Darwin's theory was dismissed initially
by physicists who calculated (correctly) that ordinary combustion could never
have kept the sun burning over the Darwinian millennia. Ernest Rutherford's
views on the radioactive transmutation of elements were attacked for sounding
too much like alchemy. Albert Einstein never was reconciled to quantum
mechanics. When the great Hungarian clinician Ignaz Philipp Semmelweis
discovered the antiseptic properties of chlorinated lime in 1850, his findings
were met with deep skepticism from many in the medical establishment. True
enough, the isolated scientist, the iconoclast, the maverick, crank, or congenital
rebel has sometimes been proved right.
But science has changed profoundly since the days of Galileo and
Semmelweis. This is most particularly true of medical science. Until the late
seventeenth century, as the historian James Burke recounts, a medical career
"flourished or foundered according to the relationship the doctor managed to
strike up at the bedside." The doctor would emphasize his "heroic and secret"
insights into disease and its cure. Each individual's illness was thought to be a
unique condition. Each doctor "would claim that all other doctors were quacks
and their remedies ill-advised or dangerous."' Doctors believed that every
83. Roisman, Law and Science: Partners or Protagonists? in ICET Symposium I
Immunotoxicology: From Lab to Law, 105, 132 (1987).
84. Alan Levin, Environmental Illness a Scientific Reality, a Legal Boondoggle, a Potential
American Tragedy, in ICET Symposium EI Immunotoxicology: From Lab to Law, p. 88 (1987).
85. My discussion here and later, on the evolution of medical science, draws from JAMES
BURKE, THE DAY THE UNIVERSE CHANGED 195-237 (1985). Epigraph quoted in BURKE, supra,
at 226; see also JOHN M. EYLER, VICTORIAN SOCIAL MEDICINE: THE IDEAS AND METHODS OF
WiJWAM FARR 9 (1979).
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disease could exhibit every symptom. Therapies were correspondingly quirky.
The patient's own view of what kind of treatment he needed was often the main
basis for recommending a cure.
In 1800, the French surgeon Xavier Bichat demonstrated that disease is a
specific phenomenon peculiar to certain lesions or tissues. Doctors began to
recognize that disease itself presents a specific and concrete target that
transcends individual patients. As medicine raised its sights from the
idiosyncratic and particular to the regular and general, it converged with
statistics, a new branch of mathematics that was evolving during the same
period. The foremost French physicist of the age, Pierre-Simon Laplace, would
show how statistics could systematically improve observation, establish the
reliability of experimental results, and reveal hidden regularities. The center of
medical learning shifted to the hospital, where patients could be studied in still
larger numbers. As Burke recounts, "[B]edside secrets gave way to a desire
among doctors to share techniques and information."" Medical journals
proliferated.
When cholera struck Europe in 1829, the hospital was overtaken by the
city. William Farr, appointed Controller of the General Register Office, set out
to conquer cholera with a radically new medical instrument: the biometer. The
biometer was pencil and paper - a life-table that insurance company actuaries
had been using for years. Farr systematically analyzed who was dying and
where. The most important things he discovered were negative. Wealth did not
protect you from cholera. Nor did occupation, or residential proximity to the
sea. What mattered was how high above the Thames you lived. Farr concluded
that cholera was caused by the river's awesome stench. He was wrong, but only
in this single, last step of the analysis. It was left to another English physician,
John Snow, to make the right connection in 1853. The key was not dirty air but
dirty water; the London sewers emptied into the Thames, so the farther
down-sewer you lived, the more likely you were to drink foul water. A few
years later Parliament passed legislation to rebuild the sewers, and cholera
disappeared from the city forever.
The story of cholera is the story of how medicine was transformed from
black art to science, from a pseudoscience of the individual to a science of
groups. The difference between the clinician who cures and the clinician who
quacks is the difference between the intellectual hermit and the
member-in-good-standing of a community of scientists. For the one, medicine
is shaped by an endless series of peculiar and individual cases; for the other, by
broad perspective and consensus conclusions. One espouses fictions as
86. BURKE, supra note 85, at 213.
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changeable as the individual patient and doctor; the other, truths that apply to
many people, not just to one. The rise of modem medical science, with its
astonishing capacity to diagnose and cure, can be traced to the decline of
individual eccentricity on both sides of the stethoscope.
Medical science is not unique; all modern science has similar origins.
Many Renaissance scientists lacked any cohesive social structure or professional
journals; Galileo had limited opportunity to belong to a larger community of
scientists, though one should not forget that his heresy was to agree with
Copernicus. But in 1660, there was established the "College for the Promoting
of Physico-Mathematical Experimental Learning," which became London's
Royal Society. 7 The original Royal Society boasted such luminaries as
Charles II, Christopher Wren (who gave the society's first lecture), Samuel
Pepys, Robert Hooke, and Sir Isaac Newton (president of the Society for
twenty-four years). Since that time, all science in the West has been built up
through collegiality and consensus - and a concomitant decline in the role of the
hermit scientist.
Modem science is thus a far cry from the science of centuries ago. It is
no longer linked to any single theory or result; it is a process of replication and
verification, a search for consensus. This is not to say that the new ideas are
shunned; the truth is quite the opposite. As Gardner points out, "Itihe
prevailing spirit among scientists, outside of totalitarian countries, is one of
eagerness for fresh ideas. . . If anything, scientific journals err on the side
of permitting questionable theses to be published, so they may be discussed and
checked in the hope of finding something of value."' But science centers on
objective fact, and the only reliable test for objectivity is to determine what
many different people can see in common, from different vantage points, in their
waking hours. What individuals see alone, awake or in their dreams, is not
science. A solitary white coat, test tube, and resume are not science. Modem
science is not a solitary undertaking.
Litigation is. Real science is the study of facts that are regular, of things
that recur in patterns, but a courtroom trial is quintessentially singular. Science
depends on placing facts in an orderly context, but a trial frames facts in
isolation. Good science transcends the here and now, the individual and
idiosyncratic, the single laboratory, the single nation, the single planet, even the
single galaxy, but a trial typically examines a singular datum, and demands that
scientific truths be rediscovered anew every time. Scientific facts emerge from
many isolated observations, as data are accumulated, vetted for error, tested for
87. See T. E. ALLIBONE, THE ROYAL SOCIErY AND ITS DINING CLUBS (1976).
88. MARTIN GARDNER, FADS AND FALLACIES IN THE NAME OF SCIENCE 10 (1957).
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significance, correlated, regressed, and reanalyzed, but trials are conducted
retail. Good science is open, collegial, and cumulative, but the courtroom
setting is discrete, insular, and closed - a one-shot decision.
The methods of science are so fundamentally different from those of
litigation that scientific anarchy in court is inevitable if rules of evidence are not
strictly maintained. Absent such rules, scientific facts remain perpetually in
play. Each patient, each injury, each illness becomes unique once again - or
so says the eighteenth-century doctor, on the payroll of the twentieth-century
lawyer. Trials are not connected; the same question about Bendectin, the Audi,
or clinical ecology can be litigated again and again. In the worst cases, courts
drift through the degenerative sequence described by the historian Jerome
Ravetz, 9 and thereafter elaborated by W. C. Clark. Tentative outlooks are
often suppressed, views are quickly polarized, and a "great confidence game"
replaces serious science. Recognition and money flow "to those making the
first, loudest, and most frightening noises." The careful skeptic is rewarded
with "accusations of corruption, cowardice, or insensitivity." There will be "an
accretion of cranks and congenital rebels whose reforming zeal is not matched
by their scientific skill. "'
HOLDING WrTNEsSES TO A COMMON STANDARD
An accretion of cranks in court follows inevitably from the great paradox
of modem liability science: in attempting to control quackery outside the
courtroom, we invite quacks to the witness stand. If this degenerative process
is to be halted, or better still reversed, judges must rediscover rules of evidence
consonant with the essential collegiality of modem science. Such rules are not
self-evident, nor can they be implemented mechanically, nor will they work their
intended effect in the hands of jurists who hold science itself in no real respect.
But rules can be formulated, and even modest rules, if enforced with
evenhanded conviction and some measure of faith in the scientific method, will
make a positive difference.
Whatever his credentials, publications, or affiliations, a scientist who
becomes the alter ego of a lawyer is no longer a scientist. At the very least,
rules to maintain some minimum separation of egos are thus urgently needed.
They are not difficult to devise.
"Training is everything," Mark Twain once suggested. "The peach was
once a bitter almond; the cauliflower is nothing but cabbage with a college
89. JERoME R. RAVmrZ, ScIENTIFIc KNOWLEDGE AND ITs SociAL PROBLEMs (1971).
90. Id. at 427.
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education." 9 ' Many, like Twain, will suppose that the cure to junk science
litigation is to have judges scrutinize professional credentials more carefully.
It isn't; Twain was only half right. Strings of letters appended to last names do
provide a useful initial screen against professional incompetence, but only a very
coarse one. Even yesterday's stellar achievement offers little assurance that
today's opinion is correct: many a great scientist takes off sooner or later on
some foolish frolic. Isaac Newton, for example, ended up in alchemy.
Johannes Baptiste van Helmont, the seventeenth-century scientist who invented
both the term and the concept of a "gas," later extolled the curative powers of
magnetic forces. David Starr Jordan, one-time president of Stanford University,
who coined the term sciosophy ("shadow wisdom") to describe the junk science
of his day, was a dyed-in-the-wool eugenicist. The modern patron of clinical
ecology is a Harvard-trained, board-certified allergist. Individuals change;
yesterday's competent medical student or even Nobel-caliber chemist can
become tomorrow's crank.
So while a resume may be a necessary condition of expert competence, it
is never a sufficient one. Twain's views notwithstanding, what defines a
cauliflower is not its resume but the views it shares with other cauliflowers. A
cabbage with an M.D. is a still a cabbage. Science is likewise defined by a
community, not by the individual, still less by a resume. Lawyers already know
this. Credentials are all but irrelevant when a doctor sits at the defense table
rather than in the witness box, and so they should be. Cucullus non facit
monachum: the cowl does not make a monk.
This was, indeed, the key insight in the old Frye rule. Frye directed the
focus away from the individual, whatever his credentials might be, and toward
the scientific consensus. Define the relevant community whose consensus views
should prevail. Then require expert witnesses to report not their own, personal
views, but the consensus views of that community.
Applying the test is not always simple; there will always be room for
quibbling. Any definition of "the relevant scientific community" will be
somewhat arbitrary. But despite what some lawyers maintain, it isn't terribly
difficult to decide which community of scientists to consult on Bendectin,
cerebral palsy, or sudden acceleration. Lawyers in fact define similar
communities all the time. A long-standing principle of negligence law is that
doctors are held to the standards of the medical community in which they
practice; one standard for an urban specialist, another for a rural generalist.
Class actions - a great favorite among many legal scholars who disdain Frye -
operate on the theory that a few individual claimants can be identified as
91. MARx TWAIN, PUDD'NHEAD WILSON (1894).
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"typical" of many others; a few from the mainstream, the reasoning runs, will
represent the interests of the rest quite adequately. Most of the time, common
sense serves well enough in identifying a relevant scientific community, far
better than it does in ascertaining the science itself.
The second step in applying Frye - determining just where the mainstream
scientific consensus lies -- is usually not all that hard either. Careful reviews
of current learning on one subject or another are published in top-notch scientific
journals all the time. Such journals have long track records of accuracy and
insight. They are backed by established scientific institutions. What they
publish is reviewed by other scientists. A judge need not know the slightest
thing about traumatic cancer or electronic cruise controls to make sensible calls
about who speaks for mainstream science on such issues and who does not.
Even a person who knows nothing about hydrology can distinguish the
mainstream of the Mississippi from stagnant pools near its banks.
As the legal scholar Bert Black has lucidly discussed, a sophisticated,
modern application of Frye looks to the methods behind a scientific report, not
to its finely detailed conclusions.' An epidemiological study will easily
survive Frye even if it is the very first to report, for example, a link between
Bendectin and birth defects, so long as standard protocols for conducting such
studies have been observed and the data are reported with error bands,
significance tests, and similar statements of caution suitable for a refereed
professional journal. What should not survive, however, is a crude imitation of
science, the unpublished hunch, the letter to the editor, the impressionistic
"mosaic theory," in which the lawyer's science of harmonious coupling
substitutes for systematic observation and analysis.
Lawyers should be the last to suggest that any of these ideas is radical or
unreasonable, because lawyers apply every one of them to defendants, though
not to witnesses. If the laws of negligence and strict liability can condemn
doctors, chemists, pharmacologists, and car manufacturers for their ineptitude,
it is because we believe that there is such a thing as ineptitude, that competence
is ascertainably different from incompetence, that there are objective standards
worth enforcing. But if people who really design cars or deliver babies are to
be judged by professional standards in court, those who accuse them must be
held to similar account. If the law is capable of holding defendants to
professional standards, it is capable of holding witnesses to the same.
Judges, too, certainly live by Frye when their own, personal interests are
at stake. The judge who currently sits back and allows the general practitioner's
92. Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scienific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595 (1988).
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testimony on esoteric problems of pharmacology is the same judge who jumps
on the next plane to the Mayo Clinic when he himself needs treatment." If he
is wise, he will also trust the Mayo Clinic doctors when they tell him which
therapies won't work, and which treatments are not worth trying. He trusts the
Mayo clinic - for both positive and negative advice - not because he knows the
individual doctors, or is impressed by their resumes, and still less because he
really knows what ails him or what cure to accept. What he trusts is the
institution, the process, the collegiality, the experience, and the track record.
And this, of course, is just where he should place his trust when administering
a legal process that establishes standards and prescribes therapies for everyone
else in the world.
The consensus scientific community supplies stopping points in abundance
for those who care to find them. An authoritative scientific pronouncement on
Bendectin by the Food and Drug Administration might be one. Or a report by
the National Institutes of Health on electronic fetal monitors. Or one by the
Centers for Disease Control on the pertussis vaccine, or the causes of pelvic
infection. Or the Surgeon General's office on tobacco. Such institutions,
established and funded to make difficult scientific calls, draw on the best and
broadest scientific resources. This is not to suggest that they are infallible; of
course they aren't. They are just less fallible - much less fallible - than a
thousand juries scattered across the country grappling with the complexities of
immune system impairment after being educated by fringe scientists peddling
iconoclastic theories about "chemically induced AIDS." Judges therefore have
abundant reason to promote the former and to be far more cautious about
admitting the latter.
Half the time, ironically, that is precisely what judges already do. If the
FDA declares that thalidomide causes limb defects in the womb, there will not
be a very long or complex trial if a drug company nonetheless sells the product
and a child is born without arms. The case is easy not because the science is
easy - it isn't - but because a much larger community has already thrashed out
the questions and reached some consensus. But there is consensus with
Bendectin too, yet Bendectin trials have lumbered forward, one by one. If the
FDA says the drug is a teratogen, liability will follow almost automatically. If
the FDA says it isn't, ask a jury. And then another, and another, as many times
in succession as the trial bar may deem to be justified by either visceral
conviction or speculative greed. We find, once again, that our modern liability
system is all accelerator and no brake.
93. . Hubert W. Smith, Scientific Proof In Relations of Law and Medicine, 23 B.U. L. REV.
143 (1943).
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When definitive pronouncements of the FDA, CDC, or Surgeon General
are not at hand, the next best place to look for the consensus views of
mainstream science is in the peer-reviewed scientific literature. There is,
indeed, a straightforward test for judges to determine which methods,
procedures, and theories have not been "generally accepted" by other scientists:
the absence of peer-reviewed publication. Writing is the medium of science.
As lawyers well know, writing imposes discipline and precision; it clarifies both
the strengths and weaknesses of a claim. Modem science simply does not exist
without it. Only a much firmer emphasis on the written word can bridge the
wide gulf between oral testimony in court and the only medium accepted by
scientists themselves for communicating important findings and theories. A
witness whose views have survived peer review in a professional journal will
already have been forced into a candid disclosure of cautions and qualifications;
good journals won't publish without them. If the published claim is of any
importance, publication will also mobilize other scientists to repeat, verify,
contradict, or confirm. By requiring professional publication as a basis for
expert opinion, judges will help line up the larger community of scientists to
shadow the necessarily smaller community of expert witnesses.
One might expect judges to be very comfortable with such a write-it-down
rule of scientific evidence, for they apply similar rules elsewhere. The "parol
evidence" rule, for example, declares that a written contract trumps the verbal
discussions that lead up to it; writing is likewise required by the law to make
binding a will or a contract for the sale of land. If the law already recognizes
that only a written document can be trusted to determine who gets Aunt
Agatha's prized collection of china dogs, it is hardly excessive to require formal
writing by anyone who claims to have identified the causes of cerebral palsy or
chemically induced AIDS.
There is one final test of expert competence, one more difficult to articulate
but of great importance nonetheless. Scientific study of the causes of injury and
disease, like scientific study of anything else, looks for regularities, patterns,
and recurrences. Modem science uses rigorous, systematic methods to locate
such regularities, methods that are rooted in statistics and significance tests,
blinded trials and especially epidemiology. Each human spirit may be individual
and unique, but the frailties of human flesh are shared by many. Medical
science has recognized this fundamental fact for the better part of two centuries.
Thus, any truly scientific claim about the causes of disease will be based
on systematic observation of many patients or test subjects, not on off-the-cuff
impressions developed in the course of clinical treatment. The skills required
to diagnose cerebral palsy, or perform infant surgery, or treat leukemia, are not
the same skills required to determine the afflictions in question. The difference
between the clinician and the scientist is one that courts must learn to understand
746




For there to be real science, the subjects of scientific study, like scientists
themselves, must connect up with a broader community. Peer review places the
clinician in the larger context of the community of clinicians; epidemiology and
systematic clinical trials place the patient in the larger context of the populace
at large. Both are enemies of bedside medicine. They force conviviality on the
hermit scientist. They elevate learning from the specific to the general, from
the singular to the plural - and thus from the idiosyncratic impression to
something we call science. As solutions to a pressing legal problem, they may
appear undramatic. But by systematically emphasizing such well-recognized
instruments of mainstream science, judges can do much to reconcile science in
court with science in the real world.
THE PRIVILEGED INTERLOPER
To hold experts to serious scientific standards is not to abandon venerable
legal principle but to reaffirm it. The expert witness is the only kind of witness
who is permitted to reflect, opine, and pontificate, in language as conclusory as
he may wish. We give him the considerable license he enjoys because some
facts are meaningful only in the context of those larger patterns of facts we call
science. It's useless for a pathologist to describe in fine detail what he saw
when the reagent was added to the blood sample, if he may not also explain
blood types, genetic rules, and why harmonious coupling between Charlie
Chaplin (group 0) and Joan Berry (group A) could not have produced Carol
Ann (group B)." The expert, in other words, is there to provide a bridge
between the particular facts of a case and patterns of facts that can be observed
and understood only through much wider study.
Once we recognize the expert witness for what he is, an unusually
privileged interloper, it becomes apparent why we must limit just how far the
interloping may go. A witness cut loose from time-tested rules of evidence to
engage in purely personal, idiosyncratic speculation offends legal tradition quite
as much as the tradition of science. Unleashing such an expert in court is not
just unfair, it is inimical to the pursuit of truth. The expert whose testimony is
not firmly anchored in some broader body of objective learning is just another
lawyer, masquerading as a pundit.
The challenge, then, is to determine when the anchor is secure. The only
possible test is to confirm that other boats have favored similar moorings. The
only way to tell that expertise is based on objective experience is to see whether
94. But see Berry v. Chaplin, 169 P.2d 442, 452, 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946).
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others with similar experience favor similar methods, adopt similar procedures,
embrace similar theories, and reach similar conclusions. This is pretty much the
standard articulated decades ago by Frye.
It is heartening to record that at least some judges have arrived at some of
these conclusions in recent years. Something of a turning point in judicial
attitudes came in 1986, in the much-cited opinion by federal appellate Judge
Patrick Higginbotham. "Our message to our able trial colleagues: it is time to
take hold of expert testimony in federal trials," he wrote.95 A slowly growing
number of able colleagues have taken these sentiments to heart. 9' Some have
begun to emphasize that radical London novelty of 1660 - the professional
society - and that radical Paris novelty of the 1820s - the professional journal
and peer review.Y Others have begun to emphasize the importance of solid
epidemiological data." Still others have concluded that medicine, too, is a part
of science, and that medical experts can be screened along the same lines as all
others.' Some have expressed mounting impatience with experts who wander
far from their specialties, such as the plastic surgeon who wanted to testify on
Bendectin although he admitted he had no knowledge of studies that had been
conducted on that drug. 100 (The witness was confined to making mountains
out of molehills outside the courtroom). Others have revised rules to allow
experts to be questioned about how much they are paid, how often they testify,
and for whom. 101 Others have rejected testimony from witnesses who actually
solicited their own employment."°  Still others have refused to enforce
contingency-fee arrangements made with expert referral agencies." 3 But, as
we have seen, many judges still reject any such limits, or equivocate so much
that defendants settle baseless claims rather than risk going to trial.
95. In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986).
96. See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Will
v. Richardson-Merrell, 647 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874
F.2d 307, 316 (5th Cir. 1989), pediion for reh'g denied, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), reh'g en
bane denied, 886 F.2d 1314 (Sth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990); Lynch v. Merrell-
National Lab., 830 F.2d 1190, 1195 (1st Cir. 1987).
97. See Thomas S. Burack, Note, Of Reliable Science: Scientific Peer Review, Federal
Regulatory Agencies, and the Courts, 7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 27, 30-31 (1987); Lynch v.
Merrell-National Labs., Inc., 830 F.2d 1190 (Ist Cir. 1987); Johnston v. United States, 597 F.
Supp. 374 (D. Kan. 1984); Perry v. United States, 755 F.2d 888 (11th Cir. 1985).
98. See Bert Black & David Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Lidgation, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 732 (1984); In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Brock
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989).
99. See, e.g., Kubs v. United States, 537 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
100. Will v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 647 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Ga. 1986).
101. Trower v. Jones, 520 N.E.2d 297 (11. 1988).
102. Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co., 646 F. Supp. 1420 (E.D. Tex. 1986), afl'd, 826 F.2d 420
(5th Cir. 1987).
103. Polo v. Gotchel, 542 A.2d 947 (N.J. 1987).
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If judges will not screen witnesses retail, state legislatures can screen
wholesale; it is encouraging to note once again that a few have recently done
so."0 ' In 1987, for example, Alabama passed a law requiring expert witnesses
to have practiced recently in the same specialty as the doctor they charge with
medical malpractice." Colorado passed a law in 1988 restricting malpractice
expert testimony to licensed physicians who can demonstrate "substantial
familiarity" with the applicable standard of care and the procedure being
litigated.'" ' A recent Maryland law bars testimony from any malpractice
expert who spends more than 20 percent of his time in court."° Kansas,
Michigan, Maryland, Rhode Island, and West Virginia have developed similar
requirements. Most of these states also bar from the witness stand academics
who do not practice at all.
The strongest antidote to bad science in court remains one that most
American judges are still regrettably reluctant to use. Europeanjudges routinely
summon their own experts. Our judges have similar powers," but few
choose to exercise them.°9  Most trial lawyers vehemently oppose
court-appointed experts, perceiving (correctly, no doubt) that consensus cannot
be good for a conflict-centered livelihood. Lawyers will therefore assure you
that there is no such thing as a neutral expert. But it is obviously possible to
find knowledgeable scientists of high principle, and having a nonpartisan judge
do the finding considerably improves the prospect of locating a less partisan
expert.
None of these ideas is the least bit radical. What they all come down to is
biblical wisdom on the punishment of harlots. If not certifiably free of sin, the
expert witness who casts the first stone should - at the very least - not be a
notorious patron of the local scientific bordello.
PUBLISH AND BE DAMNED
It has gradually dawned on professional societies that they too should be
104. See David Holthaus, States Judge Expert Witnesses Before 7hey Testify, 62 HOsP. 60
(Mar. 5, 1988).
105. Act of June 11, 1987, No. 87-189, § 9(E), 1987 Ala. Laws.
106. COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-401 (West 1991).
107. See Engineers Draft Witness Code, 217 ENGINEERING NEWS-REcoRD 40 (1986).
108. See Tahirih Lee, Court-Appointed Experts and Judicial Reluctance: A Proposal to Amend
Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 480 (1988).
109. See In re Swine Flu ImmunizationProducts Liability Litigation, 495 F. Supp. 1185 (W.D.
1980), ard, Gates v. U.S., 707 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1983); Science in Court, 243 Scl. 1658
(1989); Louis Harris & Assoc., Judges' Opinions on Procedural Issues, 45, table 6.1 (Study No.
874017) (Oct.-Dec. 1987), cited in E. Donald Elliott, Issues of Science and Technology Facing the
Federal Courts 11 (Apr. 4, 1988) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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concerned about a legal system in which the worst doctors, engineers, or
toxicologists are given a better than fair shot at prescribing standards of conduct
for the rest. If X rays, CAT scans, and cesarean sections are proliferating in
unnecessary (and even perhaps dangerous) excess, it is because too much
obstetrics, oncology, and emergency-room surgery is conducted a second time
in court, by second-rank doctors who understand law better than medicine.
Witnessing can have far-reaching professional consequences. It is therefore a
form of professional practice. Or malpractice, as the case may be.
While lawyers are uncharacteristically tolerant about this one form of
malpractice among all others, professional societies need not be. The American
Medical Association, joined by the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists and the American Academy of Pediatrics, recognizes the doctor's
"ethical obligation to assist in the administration of justice," but insists that
"[tihe medical witness must not become an advocate in the legal proceeding."
Contingent fees for witnesses are flatly labeled "unethical."" 0  Several
engineering societies have taken similar initiatives. However much lawyers may
wish otherwise, professional societies have a major role to play in maintaining
sharp lines between the practice of litigation and the practice of medicine,
engineering, or pharmacology.
Another, even more important challenge for professional societies is to
maintain scientific candor. We can all sense that truth is in peril when witnesses
say things in court they would never dare say elsewhere. Sins of omission are
less obvious, but no less common. Bad scientists routinely engage in "data
dredging," a process by which observations that coincide with initial beliefs are
carefully saved and recorded, while others somehow get lost.
The law grandly insists that individual witnesses swear to tell the whole
truth, but modem rules of evidence in fact encourage dredging of an even more
brazen kind. The lawyer dredges not for congenial data points, but for
congenial scientists themselves. The upshot of this degenerate process is an
expert-witness referral bureau that promises lawyers: "[I]f the first doctor we
refer doesn't agree with your legal theory, we will provide you with the name
of a second.""' This sort of thing corrupts not only the legal process but its
scientific participants. As Nobel physicist Richard Feynman once noted, this too
is a form of scientific corruption, and perhaps an even more "If your answer
happens to come out in the direction [those who solicited it] like, they can use
110. American Medical Association, Current Opinion op.07 (1986 Edition), quoted in AMA
Report of the Board of Trustees, Medical Expert Witness Qualifications (Resolution 22, 1-88),
Report SS (A-89) 2.
111. Quoted in Bill Richards, Doctors Seek Crackdown on Colleagues Paid for Testimony in
Malpractice Suiu, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 1988, § 2, at 1.
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it as an argument in their favor; if it comes out the other way, they don't
publish it at all. That's not giving scientific advice." Good science, Feynman
pointed out, demands "utter honesty," a "leaning over backwards" to be open
and frank. "Mhe idea is to try to give all of the information to help others to
judge the value of your contribution; not just the information that leads to
judgment in one particular direction or another."1 2
Half the time, the legal system shares this view, but half the time is not
enough. The sober scientist or doctor who works calmly day by day,
meticulously recording all her observations and speculations, tentative, final, or
otherwise, will end up seeing her every marginal note scrutinized in open court
if something goes wrong. When Audi's engineers or Merrell's pharmacologists
are summoned for trial, they will find the law to be limitlessly enthusiastic about
candor and complete disclosure. Every doctor, druggist, or corporate defendant
can be forced to empty all files and disclose every opinion and musing he ever
recorded on the hazard now being litigated.
But once litigation begins, scientific inquiry suddenly becomes altogether
private and confidential. Experts rounded up purely for the purpose of litigation
are carefully sifted and sanitized, primed and primped. And these experts, the
ones on the lawyers' payroll, are completely sheltered by a circus-tent privilege
of confidentiality. Lawyers, it turns out, believe in complete candor for every
scientist but their own. This, of course, allows them to shop around for
divergent views, and then rehearse the one or two most perfectly congenial to
the case at hand. But as Feynman points out, such shopping is just a
sophisticated way of subverting integrity and objectivity through a sort of
Darwinian selection. Lawyers will insist that the selection must be performed
in complete secrecy to protect their confidential relationship with their clients.
But a lawyer out angling for expert witnesses is not doing anything that deserves
to be protected from public scrutiny, especially when protection has such
antisocial consequences.
Feynman once suggested a pellucidly simple rule to protect against the
subversion-by-selection that lawyers routinely practice. The honest scientist
approached for his expert opinion must resolve at the outset to publish or at least
disclose his conclusion, regardless of whose side it will benefit in the
forthcoming trial. "If you don't publish such a result, it seems to me you're not
giving scientific advice," Feynman wrote. "You're being used." 13
The very thought that their own, duly hired and solemnly signed experts
112. RIcHARD P. FEYNMAN, SuRELY YOU'RE JOKNO MR. FEYNMAN! 311, 312 (1986).
113. Id. at314.
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might feel free to publish findings beneficial to the other side would of course
send trial lawyers into fits of blustery protest. But this should not deter
professional societies from policing malpractice by their members wherever it
may occur. Societies could accomplish wonders by requiring every member
approached as potential witnesses to make a Feynman declaration at the outset:
"[I]n keeping with my professional responsibilities, I will promptly publish
anything of scientific note that I may learn in our consultations, regardless of
whose legal interests my findings may favor." Judges might achieve much the
same result by forbidding lawyers to do what they now do, which is to conceal
all but the most favorable of the fistful of expert opinions they may solicit. Or
better still, by announcing that only experts solemnly Feynmanized on first
contact would be allowed to testify at all. The ultimate test of a scientist's
competence is her ability to publish in peer-reviewed journals. The ultimate test
of her scientific integrity is her readiness to publish and be damned. That is one
real lesson judges should have learned from Galileo.
GAvAGING THE RATS
Real science, science outside the courtroom, is an evenly balanced process
of proposal and disposal. Science does, of course, require a steady supply of
the new and different, the bold, the shocking, even the outrageous. But it
requires even more a steady supply of replication, verification, and peer review,
the patient development of consensus, the systematic weeding, pruning, and
uprooting of spurious data and erroneous theory. Starting promising new lines
of inquiry is important; no less important is stopping unpromising old ones.
Beginning speculation may be more exciting than ending it. But good science
depends quite as much on the patient, plodding rejection and elimination of bad
data and mistaken theory.
Judges have understood this well enough when addressing unfounded
prejudice against victims of AIDS. But when the targets ofjunk science are less
sympathetic, and their pockets deeper, the legal record has been dismal.
Let-it-all-in rules of scientific evidence have made it trivially easy to begin
pseudoscientific speculation in court and almost impossible to end it. Courtroom
science has come to revolve around the opinionated eccentric, the go-it-alone
maverick. It is heavily biased in favor of the impresario who begins
speculation, and against the plodders who end it.
The vindication of good science in court requires precisely the opposite.
Judges, like scientists themselves, will never pen a final opinion on the laws of
nature, nor should they try. What they can do, however, is realign courtroom
science with the science of scientists. This means giving much less attention to
the self-proclaimed new Galileos, and far more to the reticent stalwarts of the
mainstream scientific community. No doubt, trials will always depend on
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individual witnesses and personal credibility. But just who those witnesses are
and what they testify to can be controlled. Lawyers and judges who claim so
much aptitude in deterring incompetence and preventing accidents everywhere
else can surely find the rules to deter and prevent them in court - if they can
ever find the will. Until they do, courts will maintain their current renown for
quixotic, pseudoscientific crusades, begun in haste and repented at leisure. Until
they do, what passes for science in court won't be.
All science - all real science - contains what Karl Popper called "stopping
rules." Statements of scientific fact are statements that could be systematically
shown to be false (if they are false) after some finite, circumscribed inquiry.11 4
Questions that are forever open, questions that can be answered only one way
or not at all, are the domain of philosophy and religion, not of science. "Dioxin
may be a human carcinogen" is not a statement of scientific fact, nor is "AIDS
might be transmitted by flies." No finite number of tests and experiments could
ever refute a statement of general fact couched in "mays" or "mights." No
matter how far one searches, a weaker, as yet undetected effect may still be
lurking just over the statistical horizon. The language of could, possible, may,
might, and maybe that so often litters fringe testimony in court is not the
language of science. Nor is science a business of completely open-ended
speculation, where any idea can be floated but none can ever be finally brought
back to earth.
W. C. Clark pursued the point in his scathing commentary on what often
passes for risk assessment, but he might equally well have been speaking about
legal process:
If rats cope with the heaviest dose of a chemical that can be soaked
into their food and water, you can always gavage them. Or try mice
or rabbits. . . . [The only stopping rule is discovery of the
sought-for effect, or exhaustion of the investigator (or his funds).
Many of the risk assessment procedures used today are logically
indistinguishable from those used by the Inquisition. . . . Since
neither is advancing falsiflable propositions, neither is capable of
producing anything more than propaganda in support of its own
prejudices." 5
It is only in the most naive and uninformed views of science that every question
is perpetually unresolved, that every theory is as good as every other, that every
fact is forever in doubt. Real science has stopping points. Real scientists
114. KARL PoPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS (1963).
115. W. C. CLARc, WITCHES, FLOODS, AND WONDER DRUGS: HISTORICALPERIsPECTIVESON
RISK MANAGEMENr 291 (1981).
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respect them.
Is this to say that their minds are closed? Yes. Closing the mind,
selectively and carefully, of course, is the essence of most good science.
Science is defined as much by what it rejects as by what it accepts. Indeed,
much of good science, especially in the early stages of new inquiries, consists
of proving negatives, of closing the mind to plausible but erroneous possibilities.
Good science has closed the modem mind to perpetual motion, polywater, and
N rays, and to the curative powers of Krebiozen, Radiothor, Galvanic batteries,
and Laetrile. When a new disease like AIDS arrives on the scene, much of the
critical early research is a process of elimination: the cause is not traumatic, not
bacterial, not autoimmune, and so on. By knowing what it is not, one
eventually converges on what it is. Although the point can easily be
misinterpreted, closing the mind - to demonstrably incorrect claims and theories
-- is much of what science is about. If we no longer burn witches at the stake,
it is because science has closed most modern minds to the possibility that certain
women cause plague, pestilence, and crop blight.
If courts are to assimilate good science in their proceedings, legal process
must be equally symmetric. Judges must discover ways to cut off junk science
as resolutely and reliably as they can affirm science that spotlights real hazards.
If the only thing certain to stop Bendectin litigation is the disappearance of
Bendectin itself, legal process has failed science miserably. If the law acts
decisively (and remuneratively) against real hazards, and with perpetual
indecision against fake ones, the upshot will be a corruption of science in court,
a gradual, inexorable slide toward ignorance and paranoia.
Stopping the slide toward ignorance requires, at the very least, that
incompetence not be unleashed against competence. The paranoia possibilities
ofjunk science must be resisted more firmly still. Junk science's one very real
power is to stir up fear. As a wise trial judge in Washington State recognized
eighty years ago, there must therefore be cases of damnum absque injuria -
harm without a legally recognized injury, harm without a right to recover from
the person who caused it."" The miscreant in that case, we may recall, was
Benjamin Paschall, and the harm he had caused was frightening his neighbors
by opening his home to victims of tuberculosis. The harm was real enough, but
only because the neighbors held fears out of line with scientific reality. Today,
many judges confronted with similar AIDS cases have performed much more
courageously than did the Washington Supreme Court in the Paschall litigation.
When it comes to junk fear, a court either affirms good science or ends up
116. See Everett v. Paschall, 111 P. 879 (Wash. 1910); see also Stratton v. Conway, 301
S.W.2d 332 (Tenn. 1957).
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increasing the very injury it seeks to redress.
Yes, the pained judge too often responds, but if only we had better science,
more certainty, firmer answers. All these suggestive studies - with traumatic
cancer, Bendectin, Audis, fetal monitors, and chemical AIDS - yet never
anything absolutely, finally, completely positive. The scientists themselves
refuse to speak in absolutes. How vexing for the nonscientific bystander,
especially the one seated at the bench or in the jury box. Do another study!
Still inconclusive? Then a major research program is in order. The problem
isn't really too much bad science - it's too little good science. Until the balance
is corrected, the courts just have to muddle along, resolving the uncertainty one
way or the other, as the jury may see fit.
In fact, what is most desperately needed is almost the opposite of more
research: not less research across the board, but reliable ways of saying that
enough is enough when great and costly towers of litigation are being erected
on the soft, ever-shifting sands of junk science. In law, as in science, not all
frontiers are worth exploring forever. Not when exploration is so socially
disruptive and expensive, and when there are other, manifestly more productive
territories to be settled.
It is perhaps comforting to declare that we need more research. But that
statement is always trite and often wrong. Worse still, calls for more research
provide great comfort to junk scientists, who will find there subtle support for
their own idiosyncratic crusades. Such calls legitimize and dignify the concerns
that have been raised. Believers in Martian spaceships and astrology
undoubtedly would welcome calls for more research in those fields, too. What
takes more courage is to put an end to what, given a fair test of time, has
proved to be fruitless, wasteful speculation.
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